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Telekomunikazioak arautzeko paradigma klasiko biak —(1) estatuaren jabetza, Europa guztian eta munduko toki gehienetan
nagusi dena,  eta (2) monopolio arautuaren eredua (Estatu Batuetan erabilia)—, gaurko egunean, pribatizazioak eta desarautzeak
ordezkaturik gertatzen ari dira. Kontsumitzaileak pozteko arrazoiak dituzte: telekomunikazioen politikan gertaturiko pribatizazioak
eta desarautzeak onura anitz ekarri diete kontsumitzaileei, prezioen jaitsiera eta berritze handiagoa barne.
Giltz-Hitzak: Desarautzea. Pribatizazioa. Posta Zerbitzua, Telefonoak eta Telegrafoak. Telekomunikazioetarako Bulego
Publikoa. Zerbitzu Unibertsala. Monopolio Naturala. Merkataritzarako Mundu Erakundea. Monopolioa.
Los dos paradigmas clásicos de la regulación de las telecomunicaciones —(1) el modelo de titularidad estatal prevalescien-
te en toda Europa y en la mayor parte del resto del mundo) y (2) el modelo de monopolio regulado (utilizado en los Estados
Unidos)— están siendo sustituidos en la actualidad por la privatización y la desregulación.  Los consumidores tienen motivos para
alegrarse:  la privatización y la desregulación en la política de telecomunicaciones han provocado numerosos beneficios a los con-
sumidores,  entre los que destacan la bajada de los precios y una mayor innovación.
Palabras Clave: Desregulación.  Privatización.  Correos, Teléfonos y Telégrafos.  Oficina Pública de Telecomunicaciones.
Servicio Universal.  Monopolio Natural.  Organización Mundial del Comercio. Monopolio.
Les deux paradigmes classiques de la réglementation des télécommunications —(1) le modèle de “titularité” étatique préva-
lant dans toute l’Europe et dans la plus grande partie du reste du monde et (2) le modèle de monopole réglementé (utilisé aux Etats-
Unis)— sont substitués actuellement par la privatisation et la dérégulation. Les consommateurs ont matière à se réjouir: la privati-
sation et le dérégulation dans la politique de télécommunications ont apporté de nombreux bénéfices aux consommateurs, parmi
lesquels on remarque la baisse des prix et une plus grande innovation.
Mots Clés: Dérégulation. Privatisation. Postes, Téléphones et Télégraphes. Bureau Public de Télécommunications. Service
Universal. Monopole Naturel. Organisation Mondiale du Commerce. Monopole.
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I. Introduction
In most countries, telecommunications services histori-
cally have been provided by a state-owned monopoly.
Countries throughout the world are, however, rapidly liberal-
izing the provision of telecommunications within their borders.
Although deregulation does not create competition overnight,
in countries that have deregulated telecommunications ser-
vices there have been clear benefits: prices for these services
have fallen, customer service has improved, innovation has
increased, and more advanced infrastructures have been
built.
Businesses have a vested interest in ensuring that tele-
communications services are provided competitively. First,
businesses are major consumers of telecommunications ser-
vices and therefore receive a direct economic benefit from
lower telecommunications prices and better service. Second,
businesses that have affordable access to advanced telecom-
munications technologies are better able to compete in the
increasingly global economy. Finally, the development of 
an advanced telecommunications infrastructure will give 
consumers better access to the products and services that
businesses sell.
II. Traditional Legal Regimes
A. Public Telecommunications Systems
In most countries, telecommunications services traditio-
nally have been provided by a vertically-integrated state-
owned monopoly. Most state-owned telecommunications
monopolies are part of a PTT, a department of the government
in charge of all Post, Telephone and Telegraph services. PTTs
are typically responsible for both the operational and regula-
tory aspects of providing telecommunications services.
In some countries, postal and telecommunications func-
tions have been split apart. For example, the British Post
Office’s joint responsibilities for both postal and telecom-
munications were separated in 1981. In other countries, the
regulatory and operational functions of the PTTs have been
separated. 
B. Regulated Private Monopolies
A growing number of countries have privatized (or par-
tially privatized) their telecommunications networks and op-
erations, removing them from the control of the PTT. One of the
first countries to privatize was the United Kingdom, which sold
a 51 percent stake of British Telecom in 1984, and the remain-
der of the company in the early 1990s. By the end of 1989,
nine countries had privatized their telecommunications sys-
tems. By the end of 1996, a total of 44 countries had privatized
their PTTs, raising a total of $159 billion. At least 15 more pri-
vatizations are currently scheduled to take place in the next
12-18 months. 
Although privatization is often the first step taken by a
country seeking to liberalize its telecommunications system,
privatization is not always accompanied by deregulation. In
many countries that have privatized, the newly-privatized
entity has been permitted to retain its monopoly over the pro-
vision of most telecommunications services, at least for a cer-
tain period of time. For example, although the PTTs of Portugal,
Belgium, Greece and Germany have all been partially priva-
tized, each of these entities has retained a monopoly over
local and long-distance telecommunications service.
Although privatization removes telecommunications op-
erations from government control, regulatory functions typically
remain with the PTT, or with a new government agency created
solely to oversee telecommunications. In the United Kingdom,
for example, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) was
established to replace the General Post Office (GPO) at the
same time that British Telecom was privatized. By contrast,
regulatory oversight of telecommunications remained with the
PTTs of Germany and Belgium after these countries began 
privatization of their telecommunications operations.
A few countries in the world have always had a private
telecommunications monopoly instead of a government-
owned PTT. The most prominent example is the United States,
where AT&T was the exclusive provider of all forms of tele-
communications service for most of this century. Like countries
that have recently privatized their telecom providers, the
United States has an independent regulatory body charged
with overseeing telecommunications. In the United States the
Federal Communications Commission was established in 1934
to regulate the activity of private telecommunications firms. 
III. Deregulation and Competition
Countries throughout the world are deregulating the pro-
vision of telecommunications services within their borders.
Pursuant to national initiatives and international agreements,
by the year 2000, a third of all countries are expected to lib-
eralize their telecommunications markets; these countries
represent over 80 percent of the world’s population and global
economic activity.
Most countries that have deregulated their telecommuni-
cations markets have done so in stages. Privatization is often
the first step, but it is not an essential one. Many countries
have authorized competition, while retaining government
ownership over the former monopoly. For example, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden and Japan have all authorized competition
against state-owned telecommunications entities in the provi-
sion of domestic and international long-distance service.
Most countries require telecommunications carriers to
obtain licenses before building facilities or providing service.
In countries where deregulation has begun, one or more com-
petitors is licensed to compete against the former monopoly. A
few countries have removed licensing requirements entirely
and have permitted unrestricted entry. For example, New
Zealand has done this for all of its markets; the United States
has done this in its long-distance and international markets. 
Several countries have opted to license just one competi-
tor, creating a duopoly. Britain created a duopoly in 1982 by
licensing Mercury to compete against BT in the provision of
long-distance service. In 1991, Australia authorized Optus to
compete against Telstra in the provision of local, long-distance
and international service. Duopoly structures may be only tem-
porary. Britain opened up its markets to unlimited entrants in
1991; Australia did the same as of July 1, 1997.
Most countries have deregulated core services — such
as local, long-distance and international — at a much slower
pace than adjacent services, such as terminal equipment and
mobile wireless services. For example, although most coun-
tries still have monopolies over local and long-distance ser-
vices, a majority of countries have authorized competition in the
provision of customer premises equipment, such as telephone
handsets and data terminals. In the United States, customer
premises equipment was deregulated in 1968, and the provi-
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sion of computer-enhanced services was deregulated in the
early 1970s. The Royal Dutch PTT released its monopoly on
customer premises equipment and value-added services in
1988. Spain liberalized its terminals market in 1989. 
A large number of countries that have retained monopo-
lies in wireline services, have authorized competition in mobile
wireless services. In the last decade, for example, 17 countries
within the OECD have eliminated their monopolies on mobile
wireless service. Today, twenty-two OECD countries permit
competition in digital mobile services — 15 countries permit
two competitors; three countries permit three competitors; 
and five countries permit four or more. Nine of the 29 OECD
countries permit competition in analog mobile services — four
countries permit two competitors and three permit four or more
competitors. 
Deregulation of local, long-distance and international tele-
communications services has been slower to occur. The
United States was one of the first countries to authorize com-
petition. In the late 1970s, long-distance competition was
authorized against AT&T, which until then had been a vertically-
integrated provider of all local, long-distance and international
service. Competition in international services in the United
States did not begin until 1985, and competition in local
exchange services has just been authorized under the new
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Britain’s Telecommunications
Act of 1984 authorized Mercury Communications to compete
against BT in long-distance. In 1985, Japan reorganized its
telecommunications markets and let multiple carriers into its
market. In 1991, New Zealand began what is unquestionably
the most radical deregulation program the world, eliminating
all telecommunications regulation in favor of general laws of
competition. Today, no fewer than six countries — the U.S.,
Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Finland, Denmark — have
already deregulated local, long-distance and international ser-
vice; at least three other countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Chile have deregulated international service; Canada has
deregulated local and long-distance service (and international
service to the U.S.).
A large number of additional countries have committed to
deregulate telecommunications within their borders pursuant
to international agreements. On February 15, 1997, 69 coun-
tries signed the WTO agreement to open their markets for all
basic telecommunications services to competition from
foreign-owned companies. Each participating country commit-
ted to varying foreign ownership restrictions and to a different
schedule of implementation based on its current level of libe-
ralization and infrastructure. Pursuant to a directive of the
European Commission (90/388/EEC) the 15 member countries
of the European Union independently are required to liberalize
their telecom markets by January 1, 1998. The nations must
privatize their state-owned voice monopolies if they have not
already done so, and allow facilities-based competition for
wireless, data, cable, and public voice service.
Finally, it is worth noting that deregulation comes in differ-
ent colors and sizes. Many countries that authorize competitive
entry simultaneously establish regulatory policies designed
to ensure that markets are kept open, and that former mono-
polists don’t abuse their position. Many countries, for example,
have instituted interconnection policies that require an incum-
bent to permit a competitor to connect to the incumbent’s net-
work. Interconnection rules of various kinds have been adop-
ted by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Australia, France, and Germany. In a few countries, general
competition laws enforced through the court system are favo-
red over telecommunications-specific regulation. New
Zealand is the only country to rely almost entirely on general
competition laws as a means of regulating its telecommunica-
tions industry; Sweden and Finland also rely heavily on gener-
al competition laws as opposed to regulation.
IV. Benefits of Telecommunications Competition
A. Lower Prices and Better Service
The most pronounced benefit of competition, and the one
often noticed first by businesses and other consumers, is a
decline in consumer prices. Although the record of deregula-
tion in most countries is still fairly young, there are clear signs
that the prices for services in countries that have deregulated
such services are, on average, lower than the prices for iden-
tical services in countries where they are provided by a mono-
poly. The following examples illustrate this point:
- Among OECD countries, the average annual spending
by business users for local service in countries where there is
some degree of competition for local service is, on average, 9
percent lower than the OECD average. By contrast, the average
annual spending by a business user for local service in coun-
tries where local service is still a monopoly is, on average, 8.5
percent higher than the OECD average. In Western Europe,
local business rates are 27 percent lower than in countries with
local competition than in monopoly countries; average annual
spending by business is 30 percent lower in competitive coun-
tries than in monopoly countries.
- In Western Europea, the price of a one-minute call to the
United States is, on average, 22 percent lower in countries that
have authorized competition in the provision of international
services than in countries where international service is still a
monopoly. 
- From the U.S, Canada and countries in Western Europe,
the price of a one-minute international call to the most-fre-
quently called destination country is, on average, 33 percent
lower in countries that have authorized competition in the pro-
vision of international services than in countries where interna-
tional service is still a monopoly. 
- According to the International Telecommunications
Union, the costs of Internet access are 34 percent cheaper in
competitive countries than monopoly countries.
- The experience with deregulation in the United Kingdom
demonstrates the potential for competition in local telephone
service. In 1992, Britain authorized cable operators to provide
competitive telephone services over their networks. Today, five
years later, the U.K. has over 20 facilities-based competitors
offering local service at prices that are, in most cases, below
British Telecom’s rates. 
In competitive markets, price and quality tend to vary in
direct proportion to each other. But service quality, unlike
price, cannot easily be measured objectively. Nevertheless,
anecdotal evidence suggests that in telecommunications mar-
kets that have been opened to competition, businesses
express a much greater level of satisfaction with their service
providers than in markets served by monopolies. For example,
in Deloite & Touche’s recent Third Annual Telecommunications
Competition Survey: Business User Perspectives on
Competition Issues (a survey of 3,500 managers of telecom-
munications service in large U.S. businesses at the end of
1996), twice as many businesses were satisfied with the over-
all quality service from their long-distance provider (which
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operates in a highly-competitive market) than from their local
carrier (which still has a de facto, but not de jure monopoly).
Finally, lower prices and improved service generally in-
crease total output — that is, they cause the size of the market
to expand and grow the economy. For example, in developed
countries with competition in international service, internatio-
nal traffic per subscriber grew over twice as much from 1990-
1995 as compared to developed countries without competi-
tion. In emerging countries with international competition, traf-
fic grew over three times as much in this period as compared
to emerging countries without competition. 
B. Innovation and Availability of Advanced Infrastructure
Deregulation goes hand-in-hand with increased innova-
tion, which can be measured by the availability of advanced
telecommunications services and technology. The following
examples illustrate this point:
- Among OECD countries, the percentage of lines that
have been converted to digital switching is, on average, 29
percent higher in countries that have authorized competition in
local service than in countries where local service is still a
monopoly.
- Among OECD countries, the number of Internet hosts
per 1,000 inhabitants is, on average, 130 percent higher in
countries that have authorized competition in either local or
long-distance service than in countries where either of these
services are still a monopoly. 
- Among OECD countries, the percentage of Internet
subscribers is, on average, 109 percent higher in countries
that have authorized competition in local or long-distance ser-
vice than in countries where local or long-distance service is
still a monopoly. The United Kingdom, which has had the most
deregulated telecoms market in the European Community, also
has the highest percentage of Internet users. 
C. Global Competitiveness
There appears to be a strong correlation between coun-
tries that have deregulated telecommunications, and the over-
all competitiveness of those countries in the global economy.
This correlation is, admittedly, difficult to quantify or prove. The
World Economic Forum, conducts an annual survey of the
overall competitiveness of countries throughout the world. This
survey — the Global Competitiveness Report — identifies
“technology” as one of the key determinants of a country’s
competitiveness and growth. The World Economic Forum’s
1997 Competitive Index compares over 50 of the largest coun-
tries in the world. Six of the top ten most competitive countries
have deregulated some telecommunications service: three
countries have deregulated the provision of local, long-distance
and international telecommunications services; two additional
countries have deregulated local and long-distance; one
country has deregulated just international service. On the
second tier of most competitive countries, seven of ten coun-
tries deregulated some telecommunications service: five have
deregulated the provision of local, long-distance and interna-
tional telecommunications services; one has deregulated long-
distance and international; and one country has deregulated
just international service. The average competitive index of
countries that have deregulated local, long-distance and
international telecommunications service is over five times hig-
her than the average of all countries and nearly twice as high
as the average of all Western European countries.
V. Concerns with Deregulation
If competition in telecommunications is so great, why is it
that most countries have just now begun to authorize it? Until
fairly recently, the provision of telecommunications service,
especially local service, was widely considered a “natural
monopoly” — that is, a service most efficiently supplied by a
single firm. Many viewed the duplication of investment of
telephone competition as undesirable. In the past two de-
cades, however, technologies such as fiber optics and digital
wireless have dramatically reduced the costs of providing tele-
communications service, and, as a result, have forced a recon-
sideration of exclusionary regulatory policies based on the
“natural monopoly” concept.
Another reason that governments have outlawed com-
petition is to promote certain social policies, particularly the
universal availability of telephone service. The cost of provi-
ding telephone service varies greatly among different geo-
graphic and demographic groups. It is, for example, very
expensive to wire sparsely-populated rural areas, but relatively
cheap to wire dense urban areas. The only way that a compe-
titive business profitably may serve a high-cost customer is to
charge that customer a commensurably high rate. But if such
conditions were allowed to exist, very few people living in rural
areas would be able to afford telephone service. This is bad for
everyone, as the value of the telephone network increases as
more users are connected to it. Until recently, the accepted
logic has been that, a monopoly is required in order to provide
universal telephone service. The reason is that, only a mono-
poly can engage in price discrimination — that is, charge
some customers higher rates than others. A firm in a compe-
titive industry could not as easily engage in such price discri-
mination — it would lose sales to other firms willing to drive pri-
ces down to marginal costs. A monopolist, on the other hand,
does not suffer from that inconvenience: under certain cir-
cumstances, it is able to engage in price discrimination. 
Recent criticisms of deregulatory initiatives are that com-
petition has been slow to emerge, and that the regulatory costs
of maintaining competition are very high. But these arguments
are not fair criticisms of competition itself; if anything, they
speak only to the particular regulatory mechanisms that
governments have employed to open their markets. Even under
the most permissive legal regimes, like New Zealand, competi-
tion does not develop overnight. Monopolists typically lost their
market shares very gradually, and, if given the opportunity, a
monopolist will try to retain its dominance for as long as pos-
sible. Competitors do, however, invariably gain ground against
incumbents. After nearly 20 years of long-distance competition
in the United States, AT&T has, for the first time just this year,
earned less than 50 percent of all long-distance revenues. 
There are, to be sure, costs involved with deregulation
and overseeing the transition to competition. In most countries,
the transition from monopoly to competition is managed
through regulation such as rules governing interconnection,
price regulation, and mechanisms designed to prevent cross-
subsidization by former monopolists. But the costs of these
mechanisms that help promote competition are trivial com-
pared to the costs of retaining monopolies, and foregoing the
benefits that are discussed above.
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